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INSURANCE-RECOVERY-EXTENT UNDER INTEREST LIMITATION CLAUSE OF 
THE STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE POLICY - Plaintiff leased vacant land and 
erected a building thereon. At the election of the lessor the lease could be 
terminated upon thirty days' notice, plaintiff having the right to remove 
the building. Defendant issued to plaintiff a policy insuring the building 
against loss by fire to the extent of the cash value of the property at the time 
of loss, but not exceeding the repair or replacement cost, "nor in any event 
for more than the interest of the insured."1 The building was destroyed by 
fire and plaintiff sued to recover the full amount of the insurance. The 
trial court refused to admit defendant's proffered evidence that three months 
prior to the fire plaintiff's lessor served notice terminating the lease and had 
taken action to dispossess, and that plaintiff had made arrangements to 
have the building demolished. On appeal, held, reversed. As affecting the 
amount of the insured's recovery under the interest limitation clause and 
as constituting a factor in the cost or value of the destroyed building the 
evidence was properly excluded. However, such evidence should have been 
admitted as bearing -on the question whether insured had any insurable 
interest in the building.2 Federowicz. v. Potomac Insurance Co., 7 App. Div. 
(2d) 330, 183 N.Y.S. (2d) 115 (1959). 
Recovery under the New York standard fire insurance policy is limited 
by the language "nor in any event for more than the interest of the insured."S 
Superimposed on this stated limitation seems to be an unwritten limitation 
which recognizes the fire insurance policy as a contract of indemnity only.4 
Where the property interest of the insured is less than a fee, the interest-
limitation clause and the indemnity principle would produce identical 
1 Z'/ N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §168; principal case at 331. 
2 For insurance on property to be validly obtained, the insured must have an insurable 
interest in the property. In the principal case there were provisions of the lease upon 
which a finding might be made, in the absence of other proof, that upon giving notice to 
remove and the failure of the tenant to remove within the required time the building , 
became the property of the lessor. If such were found, then the plaintiff would have no 
insurable interest. See VANCE, INSURANCE §29 (1951). 
8 This standard policy has been adopted in most of the states in the same form or with 
only minor deviations; 1951 INS. L.J. 785 at 786-787; 48 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 354 at 355, 
n. 6 (1953). For general discussions of the standard fire insurance policy, see 42 CoL. L. 
REv. 1227 (1942); 39 ILL. L. REv. 66 (1944); 20 J. AMER. INS, 15 (April 1943); 20 J, 
AMER. INS. 9 (Sept. 1943). 
4PATIERSON, EssENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW, 2d ed., 137 (1957); 4 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE 
§2107, pp. 10-11 (1941); 6 id., §3823. 
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results since a determination of the amount for which indemnity will be 
had is based on the extent of the property interest. However, where the 
insured's property interest is a fee, different results would be reached de-
pending on whether the interest-limitation clause or the indemnity princi-
ple were applied, since the factors used to measure each are different. Ob-
viously the interest-limitation clause would be wholly ineffectual as a 
limitation on recovery where the interest is a fee; there would be no limited 
interest. In such a case, an otherwise unlimited recovery could still be 
reduced by the application of the indemnity principle where the insured 
suffered a financial loss of less than the value of the fee. Be this as it may, 
considerable authority supports the proposition adopted in the principal 
case that the holder of the fee in a building may recover the full value there-
of, not exceeding the amount of insurance, regardless of other factors which 
might tend to reduce or eliminate his actual financial loss.5 The holder of 
the fee in betterments and improvements is similarly entitled to full recov-
ery on a fire insurance policy when such betterments and improvements are 
destroyed by fire.6 Cases which are concerned with insurance of a less-than-
a-fee interest, a limited interest, generally limit recovery to an amount which 
is compatible with both the limited-interest clause and the indemnity 
principle. In these cases, the interest of the insured has been consistently 
dealt with as his property interest, whether it be as lessee,1 vendor,s life 
Ii Laurent v. Chatham Fire Ins. Co., 1 Hall (N.Y.) 45 (1828) (lease giving lessee right 
to remove building was about to expire when fire destroyed building); First Nat. Bank 
of Highland Park v. Boston Ins. Co., 17 Ill. (2d) 147, 160 N.E. (2d) 802 (1959) (land contract 
vendor of buildings destroyed, contract price less than amount of insurance); Girard Ins. Co. 
v. Taylor, 6 App. Div. (2d) 359, 177 N.Y.S. (2d) 42 (1958) (owner of land and building who 
conveyed the land but retained the building with right to remove); Heidisch v. Globe and 
Republic Ins. Co., 368 Pa. 602, 84 A. (2d) 566 (1951) (owner of property condemned by 
eminent domain still held title); Rosenbloom v. Maryland Ins. Co., 258 App. Div. 14, 15 
N.Y.S. (2d) 304 (1939) (building owner had contracted to sell land and build; after fire, 
the land was sold by owner for only a slightly reduced price); Godwin v. Iowa State Ins. 
Co., (Mo. App. 1930) 27 S.W. (2d) 464- (plaintiff prior to fire ordered building demol-
ished); German Fire Ins. Co. v. Duncan, 140 Ky. 27, 130 S.W. 804 (1910) (vendor of land 
who retained right to remove building); Irwin v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 58 Misc. 441, 
109 N.Y.S. 612 (1908) (owner of a building declared to be a public nuisance and ordered 
removed; fire destroyed the building prior to removal); Tiemann v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 76 
App. Div. 5, 78 N.Y.S. 620 (1920) (vendor received full purchase price); Foley v. Manu-
facturers' & Builders' Fire Ins. Co., 152 N.Y. 131, 46 N.E. 318 (1897) (owner of building 
partially completed at time of destruction; by his contract with insured, contractor was 
liable for completion of the building); Washington Mills Emery Mfg. Co. v. Weymouth 
& Braintree Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 135 Mass. 503 (1883); Washington Mills Emery Mfg. Co. 
v. Commercial Fire Ins. Co., (C.C. Mass. 1882) 13 F. 646 (vendor of land who retained 
ownership of building and right to remove; building was destroyed by fire). 
6Modem Music Shop v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 131 Misc. 305,226 N.Y.S. 630 (1927) 
(lessee made improvements over which he retained full ownership and right to remove 
at termination of lease; improvements were destroyed by fire). 
7 See Niblo v. North Amer. Ins. Co., 1 Sandf. (N.Y.) 551 (1848); Hale v. Simmons, 200 
Ark. 556, 139 S.W. (2d) 696 (1940); Lighting Fixture Supply Co. v. Fidelity Union Fire 
Ins. Co., (5th Cir. 1932) 55 F. (2d) llO; Sievers v. Union Assur. Society of London, (Cal. 
1912) 128 P. 771. 
s See Shotwell v. Jefferson Ins., 5 Bos. (N.Y.) 247 (1859); McWilliams v. Farm & City 
Mut. Ins. Assn., 248 Iowa 233, 80 N.W. (2d) 320 (1957). 
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tenant,9 or mortgagee.10 When, in the principal case, the court in consid-
ering the interest of the insured looked to his property interest,11 it took a 
sound view.12 The new interest-limitation clause replaced two of the "moral 
hazard" provisions found in the old standard form.is These provided for 
voidance of the policy if the interest of the insured was other than that of 
unconditional and sole ownership or if the subject of the insurance was a 
building on ground not owned by the insured in fee simple. These clauses 
clearly dealt with the property interest of the insured. And the court cor-
rectly treated the new clause as having the effect of expanding the kinds of 
property interests covered.14 But the court refused to recognize the effect 
of the indemnity principle in the case of the holder of the fee.lls There are 
a few cases which do apply the indemnity principle to limit recovery regard-
less of the extent of the property interest and deny to the holder of the full 
legal title full recovery under a fire insurance policy upon the destruction 
of the insured property.16 In such cases recovery is limited to the amount 
of the financial loss sustained. And it seems proper that the nature of the 
property interest of the insured should not affect the applicability of the 
indemnity principle.11 Where there is an apparent conflict between the 
interest-limitation clause and the indemnity principle, as there may be in 
the case of insurance of a fee and as there is in the principal case, there is 
no sound reason to reject the indemnity principle.1 8 
Roger W. Kapp 
9See Hartford Ins. v. Haas, 87 Ky. 531, 9 S.W. 720 (1888); Beekman v. Fulton & 
Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 66 App. Div. 72, 73 N.Y.S. 110 (1901); Convis v. Citizens Mut. 
Fire Ins. Co., 127 Mich. 616, 86 N.W. 994 (1901); Western Assur. v. Stoddard, 88 Ala. 606, 
7 S. 379 (1889); Agricultural Ins. v. Yates, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 984 (1889); Andes Ins. Co. v. 
Fish, 71 Ill. 620 (1874). 
10 See Kemochan v. N.Y. Bowery Ins., 5 Duer (N.Y.) I (1855); In re Clover Ridge 
Planting & Mfg. Co., 178 La. 302, 151 S. 212 (1933); Saverese v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 260 
N.Y. 45, 182 N.E. 665 (1932). 
11 See principal case at 336. 
12See PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAw, 2d ed., 141 (1957); Godfrey, "Some 
Limited Interest Problems," 15 LAW AND CoNTEM. PROB. 415 at 417 (1950); 48 N.W. UNIV. 
L. REv. 354 at 355 (1953); 1950 INS. L.J. 722 at 725; 20 J. AMER. INS. IO (Sept. 1943). 
13 See N.Y. Sess. Laws (1917) c. 440. 
14 See principal case at 335. 
15 Id. at 336. 
16 Ramsdell v. Ins. Co. of North America, 197 Wis. 136, 221 N.W. 654 (1928); Glens 
Falls Ins. Co. v. Sterling, (Md. 1959) 148 A. (2d) 453 (building partially completed when 
destroyed by windstorm; no pecuniary loss suffered because contractor was obliged to 
submit completed building); Edlin v. Security Ins. Co., (S.D. Ill. 1957) 160 F. Supp. 487; 
Tauriello v. Aetna Ins. Co., 14 N.J. Super. 530, 82 A. (2d) 226 (1951). 
J.7 See PATTERSON, EssENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAw, 2d ed., 142 (1957); Bonbright and 
Katz, "Valuation of Property To Measure Fire Insurance Losses," 29_ CoL. L. REv. 857 at 
888, 898-899 (1929). 
18 See Flint Frozen Food v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 8 N.J. 606, 86 A. (2d) 233 (1952) (full 
payment of debt owed was made after insured chattels were destroyed by fire). 
